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This study examines the factors that contribute to effective contract design within the 
context of buyer-seller relationship. Research streams on contract factors, supply 
chain factors, environmental factors, and competitive factors were reviewed to arrive 
at 18 contract factors. A hybrid model of Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation 
Laboratory (DEMATEL) and Analytic Hierarchy Process (ANP) analysed empirical 
data collected from 17 experts to weight the importance of contract factors. It was 
found that most important factors are, in order of significance: policies, supplier 
technology, force majeure, formality, relationship learning, buyer power, legal 
actions, liquidated damages, supplier power and partnership.  
Keywords: Contract, Contract Design, buyer-seller relationship, DEMATEL, ANP, 
decision making. 
 
Introduction 
The volume of work on contracts is enormous in the economics and operations 
management literatures (Tirole, 1988; Tsay et al. 1999; Cachon, 2003; Krishnan et al. 
2004; Liu and Etinkaya, 2009). Despite the established role of contracts in economies 
and markets, there is a substantial gap in our knowledge of the factors underling the 
design of effective contracts within the context of buyer-seller relationships. This gap 
stems from the widely accepted thesis that contracts cannot be complete and in many 
times are "excessively" incomplete (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Williamson, 
1975, 1996).  
The contribution of this study is to synthesise the research streams in order to 
arrive at an optimal contract design. Moving beyond the transactional power of a 
contract and the repercussions of its incompleteness, the contract design may have a 
dual effect on buyer-seller relationships: an incomplete contract may stimulate 
opportunism which can alter the governing equilibrium (Mesquita and Brush 2008). 
On the other hand, a contract may contain incentives that promote ethical choices that 
foster trust and enhance long-term collaborations (Merkert and Hensher, 2013). Using 
the strategy lenses, a contract needs not be complete in transactional terms, yet it 
needs to contain clauses that promote an effective buyer-seller relationship. In this 
way, companies can use contracts as a mechanism to maintain their competitive 
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advantage that resides within relationships maintained with external organisations 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000). Nevertheless, it is typical 
in supply contract design, the more powerful party to assume the leadership position 
(Liu and Etinkaya, 2009). 
Literature Review 
In order to examine what factors contribute to an effective contract design, four 
research streams were reviewed (contract factors, supply chain factors, environmental 
factors, competitive factors) and 18 factors were identified).  
Contract Factors 
Ranjan and Lee (2007) examined contracts in the context of global trade and found 
that contract enforcement directly affects trade volume and product differentiation. 
Hart (2011) argued that contract design needs to deal with imbalance in bargaining 
power between contractors. Weber and Mayer (2011) pointed out that contract may 
induce certain behaviours thus indirectly affect supplier performance and groups 
contracts in two categories: (i) promotional contracts that endorse trust and take a 
partnership approach and (ii) prevention contracts that dictate high conformance to 
avoid contract default. Wilkinson-Ryan’s (2010) suggested that a contract with a 
Liquidated Damages (LD) clause is more likely to default than one without it since 
firms will try to comply with moral and social norms to meet their obligations. 
Ryall and Sampson (2009) reviewed the key terms from 52 technology 
development contracts in telecommunication companies and found great variance on 
contract purposes and relational governance. Experienced firms were more likely to 
include detailed terms and conditions and implement penalty clauses, as well as place 
more emphasis and reliance on contractual tools such as LDs to ensure contractual 
adherence following firsthand experience of defaulting partners rather than solely 
relying on relational governance. Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggested that relational 
governance was often incorporated into formal contracts and concluded that the two 
were complementary. 
Supply Chain Factors 
Within a buyer-seller context, agency theory provides a useful lens to examine 
governance mechanisms and their role in ensuring appropriate supplier behaviour 
Vlachos et al., 2008). Incentive contracts are popular in corporate governance to 
motivate managers and align their interests with those of shareholders (Holmstrom, 
1982). The literature around this theory focuses on different ways that contracts 
incentivise agents and means to resolve the issues that arise when contracts are 
incomplete (Hart and Moore, 1990). Baiman et al. (2001) applied agency theory in a 
buyer-supplier relationship to examine contracting issues with respect to internal and 
external failures. Research has focused primarily on understanding how governance 
tools of the principal might serve to minimize agent opportunism since the lower the 
opportunism is the stronger supply chain relationships can develop (Pardalos et al. 
2004; Kashyap et al., 2012).  
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Merkert and Hensher (2013) surveyed of European and Australian regional 
airlines and found that air and bus contracts were particularly unclear and incomplete 
in two key contract issues, namely incentives to improve performance/grow patronage 
and change events. Merkert and Hensher (2013) suggested that incentives in contracts 
should go beyond minimum service levels and should be clearly defined in the 
contracts. Pillai and Sharma (2003) noted that, in principle, most partnerships should 
be founded on trust, commitment and information exchange. Trust is the product of 
the common history and incremental investments in a supplier-buyer relationship and 
reflects the extent commitments are sustained (Vlachos and Bourlakis, 2006).  
Contextual Factors 
There are two primary contextual factors: impossibility of performance and 
commercial impracticability due to factors beyond the control of the trading parties. 
Force majeure generally refers to circumstances that are beyond the control and 
without the fault or negligence of the non-performing party (Allen, 2005). Contracts 
will often contain a force majeure clause to protect the supplier being reprimanded if 
they cannot meet their contractual obligations as a result of such an event (Buffalow, 
2011). A Force Majeure clause in a contract is intended to excuse a party from not 
performing its contractual obligations due to unforeseen events such as natural 
disasters, and war. Tanenbaum (2006) pointed out that a force majeure clause can 
actually increase the risk of default because it is seen as accepted that a force majeure 
event is likely to occur at some point in the transaction relationship, providing 
disincentive for the supplier to adequately prepare and mitigate disruptions. 
Tanenbaum (2006) suggested combining force majeure clauses with disaster recovery 
and business continuity provisions to ensure the supplier anticipates force majeure 
events and continues to provide some level of service. 
Competitive Factors  
Porter identified five forces that determine the attractiveness of an industry: buyer 
power, supplier power, the competitive threat posed by current rivals, the availability 
of substitutes, and the threat of new entrants (Porter, 1980). Based on the five forces 
model, firms could develop strategies to alter the firm's position in the industry vis-à-
vis competitors, suppliers, and buyers (Porter, 2008). Therefore, the contracts that 
firms design need to reflect their competitive position from which it could best defend 
against these competitive forces or influence them to its advantage. Without written 
incentives in a formal contract to oblige suppliers not exploiting their power there is 
always the possibility of losing competitive advantage. The same stands true for 
customers who always have the option to switch suppliers to minimise their price and 
risks. 
Methodology 
This study employs Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) 
to investigate interdependences between contract, governance and competitive factors 
and then incorporates Analytical Network Process (ANP) to evaluate the magnitudes 
among factors and their dependences when designing contracts. This section, at first, 
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presents the application of DEMATEL for network relationships, and second, applies 
ANP to obtain the relative weights respective to each factor. Finally, it presents data 
collection according to the chosen methodology. 
Application of DEMATEL for network relationship 
The DEMATEL technique was initiated for a Science and Human Affairs Program by 
the Battelle Memorial Institute of Geneva between 1972 and 1976. It was established 
to solve complex problems. It can elevate the understanding of the issues, groups of 
interaction factors, criteria and provide a feasible solution by building a hierarchically 
relevant network system. This technique has been applied for solving complex 
decision making in a wide spectrum of management challenges, such as the choice of 
knowledge management strategy and the selection management systems of SMEs 
(Tsai and Chou, 2009).  
There are four steps in the DEMATEL method as described by Wu (2008): Step 
1: Generate the direct-relation matrix. The comparison scale among the criteria has 
four levels: 0 (no influence), 1 (low influence), 2 (high influence), and 3 (very high 
influence). Experts are given pairs of factors and make wise comparisons in terms of 
influence and direction between criteria. The expert evaluations are the initial data 
obtained as the direct-relation matrix that is a n×n matrix A, in which aij is denoted as 
the degree to which the criterion i affects the criterion j. Step 2: Normalise the 
direct-relation matrix. The normalisation of the direct-relation matrix A produces 
the normalized direct-relation matrix X obtained through formulas. Step 3: Compute 
the total-relation matrix. Having calculated the normalized direct-relation matrix X, 
the total relation matrix T can be acquired. Step 4: Set a threshold value and obtain 
the impact-relation map. Based on the matrix T, each aspect tij of matrix T provides 
information about how aspect i influences aspect j. A threshold value (P) of 30% was 
set to remove invalid effects from consideration in matrix T.  
The sum of rows and the sum of columns are respectively denoted as vector D and 
vector R. The horizontal axis vector (D+R) named as ‘‘Prominence’’ is calculated as 
the sum of D and R. Prominence signifies the importance of each factor. The vertical 
axis (D-R) named as “Relation” is calculated by subtracting D from R. Relation 
classifies factors into two groups: a cause group and an effect group. When a factor 
has positive in the vertical D-R axis, then it belongs to the cause group, otherwise it 
belongs to the effect group. Therefore, the causal diagram can be acquired by 
mapping the dataset of the (D + R, D - R) as a dispersion graph, providing valuable 
insight for decision making. 
Weight measurements by integrating DEMATEL and ANP 
The purpose of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (ANP) approach is to solve problems 
involving interdependence and feedback among criteria or alternative solutions. ANP 
is the general form of the AHP, which has been used in multi-criteria decision-making 
(MCDM) in order to consider non-hierarchical structures. The ANP handles 
dependence within a criterion (inner dependence) and among different criteria (outer 
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dependence). According to Lee et al., (2011), DEMATEL method is not going to be 
used only to calculate the level of impacts among different groups of factors, but the 
normalised total-influence matrix will be incorporated into un-weighted supermatrix 
W in the ANP to calculate the level of interdependences of different factors. 
Although key interdependences of clusters can be obtained via DEMATEL, the 
ANP algorithm determines interdependences between clusters. The total-influence 
matrix acquired by DEMATEL is similar to the concept of ANP, which confirms the 
importance and influence of criteria through questionnaires. The ANP algorithm runs 
in four steps: Step 1: Construct the structure of the network and establish its 
objectives. Then, the network is decomposed into network hierarchical structure. Step 
2: Calculate the unweighted supermatrix W. Since DEMATEL produced the total-
influence matrix, the unweighted supermatrix W can be calculated by normalizing the 
sum of influence for each criterion in each hierarchy under the criteria of total-
influence matrix. Step 3: Obtain the weighted supermatrix by normalizing the sum of 
impact for each hierarchy and each dimension in the dimensions total-influence 
matrix. Step 4: Obtain the limited supermatrix, by multiple productions of the 
weighted supermatrix until the vector values in the limited supermatrix become stable. 
The vectors of the limited supermatrix represent the relative weights of each factor in 
relation to the defined objective. Sorting the limited supermatrix W according to the 
relative weights of each factor gives insights on the significance and contribution of 
each factor as well as each cluster to the objective of network. 
Data Collection 
Experts were selected from a leading international manufacturing company with 
headquarters in France. The company enjoys multi-billion dollars annual revenues 
and relies upon contractual partners totalling about 1,800 suppliers over 30 countries. 
Experts hold the positions of Contract Managers, Quality and Supply Chain 
Professionals, Procurement Leaders and Finance Managers. A total of 17 experts took 
part in this study. Most experts were senior managers with over ten years of 
experience only three of them had between two and ten years of procurement 
experience. Interviews took place on early 2012 by experienced, trained researcher. 
Other procurement employees were also interviewed in order to derive at an 
appropriate threshold value in DEMATEL analysis. 
Findings 
This section presents the results of the analysis of the experts’ preferences on the 
factors that contribute to creating a strong contract. 
Analytical technique relationship by DEMATEL 
This study applies DEMATEL to construct the structure in contract decision making 
and analyze the interdependent relationships of eighteen factors (Agreement of formal 
contract, Relationship Learning, Liquidated Damages, Undertaking of legal action, 
Trust, Incentives, Long-term relationships, Partnership approach, Supplier take-over 
intention, Re-organization of the supplier, Force majeure, Change in policies and 
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procedures, Supplier's technology, Supplier power, Buyer power, Threat of Rivals, 
Threat of new entrant, Threat of Substitution).  
The prominences and relations between techniques are reflected by the sums of 
influences and provided in Table 1, which shows greater d coefficient of Buyer power 
as 4.22 than 4.11of Formality and Supplier power with 3.95, which indicates that 
Buyer power and Formality are the most important issues to consider in writing strong 
contracts. This finding support the hypothesis that the company needs to write a 
contract in a formal way than sets clear the negotiating power of buyer (the reporting 
company itself) and then the power of supplier (contractor). 
Table 1 The sum of influences of factors 
Factors D R D+R 
Prominence 
D-R 
Relation Formality 4.11 4.44 8.54 -0.33 
Relationship Learning 3.44 4.30 7.74 -0.86 
Liquidated Damages 2.40 3.69 6.09 -1.29 
Legal action 2.90 3.38 6.28 -0.47 
Trust 3.43 4.13 7.55 -0.70 
Incentives 2.08 2.98 5.06 -0.90 
Long-Term 3.54 4.48 8.03 -0.94 
Partnership 3.61 4.36 7.96 -0.75 
Supplier take-over 2.61 0.88 3.49 1.73 
reorganisation 1.30 0.53 1.83 0.77 
Force majeure 0.67 0 0.67 0.67 
Change in policies  2.11 1.26 3.37 0.85 
Supplier technology 0.86 1.27 2.13 -0.41 
Supplier power 3.95 3.04 6.99 0.91 
Buyer power 4.22 3.41 7.64 0.81 
Rivals 2.41 2.05 4.46 0.36 
New entrant 2.62 1.99 4.61 0.63 
Substitution 2.52 2.60 5.12 -0.07 
 
However, findings are different with the r coefficient. Factors could be classified 
into groups: the first one with significant high coefficients and the second one with 
low r coefficients. In the first group, there are factors that define the type of the 
contract such as the long-term (4.48), formality (4.44), partnership (4.36), the 
Relationship Learning (4.3), and finally trust (4.13). In order to put the factors in a 
perspective, the Influence Relationship Map depicts the dispersion graph of 
prominence (D+R) and relation (D-R) (Figure 1).   
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Figure 1 Influence Relationship Map 
Prominence reveals how much importance the criterion has and Relation divides 
criteria into a cause group (positive relation) and an effect group (negative relation). 
Figure 1 makes clear that buyer and supplier powers are cause factors and the long-
term, formality, partnership, the Relationship Learning, and trust are effect factors.  
Interestingly, supplier take-over is the highest cause factor yet its relation is lower 
than the effect group factors. 
 Weight calculation by incorporating DEMATEL with ANP 
The influence relationship map obtained through DEMATEL can provide us with an 
understanding of the entire structure. Table 2 shows the priorities of the factors. 
Among the eighteen factors, three environmental factors are the most important ones: 
Policies (weight 0.39361), Supplier's Technology (weight 0.30705), and Force 
Majeure (weight 0.29934), in order of importance. Relative to other factors, experts 
perceive three supplier factors to be least important: Take-Over (weight 0.15836), 
Incentives (weight 0. 15148), and Reorganisation (weight 0. 13079). 
Conclusions 
While the use of contracts is ubiquitous in buyer-seller transactions, the design of 
effective contracts has been debated in various research streams. In transaction cost 
economics, contracts protect trading partners from opportunism (Williamson, 1975, 
1985, 1996). In agency theory, contracts interact with governance mechanisms, define 
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and get defined from agent behavior (” (Bergen et al.1992; Holmstrom, 1982). 
Competitive factors are part of effectively-designed contracts since property rights 
cannot apply to control a relationship; therefore contracts govern relationships and 
form networks (Porter, 1980). Further, specific clauses in contracts can be written in 
ambiguous ways and either foster or forge trust, mitigate or encourage opportunism 
thus facilitate or inhibit trust development respectively (Weber and Mayer, 2011). 
Therefore, there is no effective way to design contracts patently. 
Table 2 Priorities 
Rank Factor Group Normalized By 
Cluster 
Limiting 
1 Policies  Environmental Factors  0.39361 0.098403 
2 Supplier's 
Technology  
Environmental Factors  0.30705 0.076762 
3 Force Majeure  Environmental Factors  0.29934 0.074835 
4 Agreement Of 
Formal Contract  
Contract Factors  0.28346 0.070866 
5 Relationship 
Learning 
Contract Factors  0.25768 0.064419 
6 Buyer Power  Competitive Factors 0.23896 0.059739 
7 Legal Action  Contract Factors  0.2366 0.059151 
8 Liquidated 
Damages  
Contract Factors  0.22226 0.055564 
9 Supplier Power  Competitive Factors 0.22158 0.055394 
10 Partnership  Supplier Management  0.18828 0.047071 
11 Trust  Supplier Management  0.18663 0.046658 
12 Threat Of New 
Entrant  
Competitive Factors 0.18617 0.046543 
13 Long Term  Supplier Management  0.18445 0.046112 
14 Threat Of 
Substitution  
Competitive Factors 0.18019 0.045048 
15 Threat Of Rivals  Competitive Factors 0.1731 0.043276 
16 Take-Over  Supplier Management  0.15836 0.039591 
17 Incentives  Supplier Management  0.15148 0.037869 
18 Reorganisation  Supplier Management  0.13079 0.032698 
This study adopts the methods of DEMATEL and ANP to analyse the 
interdependences between factors that affect the design of an effective contract. By 
integrating the dynamic influence relationship obtained by DEMATEL with ANP, 
levels of direct and interactive impacts for factors are quantified and ranked, and the 
outcomes are robust to actual performances.  
The contract factors obtained through the proposed approach are objective for the 
following reasons. First, the results are generated by a group of experts with at least 
10 years of experience in contract design within the buyer-seller context. Second, the 
analytical process weights the contract factors in a way than minimises any loss of 
information as it would be the case with data analysis methods like factor analysis or 
structural equation modelling. Managers are equipped with a strong analytical 
technique than minimizes theoretical limitations and takes into account all 
information available for decision making using criteria that provide the most 
effective direction towards contract design. 
The proposed method also simplifies the existing models and raise efficiency 
without affecting the key outcomes. The empirical results provide evidences of 
significant interdependent and self-feedback relationships among 18 factors grouped 
in four categories. The weights of factors are numerically obtained and demonstrate 
that the most important factors are, in order of significance: policies, supplier 
9 
 
technology, force majeure, formality, relationship learning, buyer power, legal 
actions, liquidated damages, supplier power and partnership. The less significant 
factors were: re-organisation, incentives, take-over, thread of rivals, thread of 
substitution, long term Threat of New Entrant and trust. 
The finding consolidated from mathematical theories and judgments of experts is 
essentially useful to companies that see a dual role of contracts, that is protect from 
opportunism and an opportunity for developing the buyer-seller relationship. This 
study suggests that, instead of protecting opportunism, companies design contracts to 
promote cooperation and partnership within a buyer-seller relationship. Contracts can 
become a tool to develop a partnership by giving trading partners a shield for their 
transaction and a tool to align their performance with their partnership objectives. 
Contracts need to deal with competitive issues such as buyer and seller power and by 
doing so, they protect from opportunism. Trust and incentives were ranked low in 
order of significance. Regarding incentives, there is a difficulty to obtain the optimum 
incentive equilibrium, which may disqualify incentives as an opportunism protection 
mechanism. Regarding trust, companies seem to prefer quantified ways to build a 
relationship and the concept of trust may be blatant to trust. 
There are several limitations in this study. Information from experts working in 
different companies, in the public sector, in small and medium companies would 
provide a stronger test of our model and will be the subject of future research. A 
recommendation for future research would also be to maintain the current design and 
compare results from different sources. i.e. large companies vs. small companies, 
buyers vs. sellers, product –vs. service offered. The second empirical limitation is that 
the sample of experts was drawn solely from the large manufacturing company in 
Europe. Cultural issues as well law in different counties i.e. in Asia and USA may 
moderate the contract design factors and produce different results. Therefore, future 
research should examine the contract factors in other contexts and countries which 
could produce a basis for cross-validation of the model. 
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